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713 
IMPLEMENTING	  OLMSTEAD	  	  
BY	  OUTLAWING	  WAITING	  LISTS	  
What would happen if everyone was placed on a decades long 
waiting list for water? And what if the only way to be guaranteed water 
for your children immediately was to put them in prison? What if every 
state had a separate waiting list and you went to the bottom of the list if 
you moved? Wouldn’t there be riots in the streets? 
Hundreds of thousands of people with intellectual and develop-
mental disabilities . . . are waiting for services as vital to them as wa-
ter. . . . For those who need help immediately, their only option is an 
institution.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of those waiting is Seth, a twenty-three year old who has autism.2 After strug-
gling to complete high school, Seth worked for several weeks in a mailroom, supported 
by a job coach.3 When his allotted twenty hours of job coaching expired, Seth lost his 
mailroom job.4 Now, Seth spends his days alone at home, watching television.5 Describ-
ing Seth’s mood as terrible, Seth’s mother feels powerless to help as his behavior contin-
ues to deteriorate, and she laments that “[i]f Seth had waiver services, everything would 
change.”6 Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (“HCBS” or “waiver ser-
vices”) would provide Seth with meaningful activities and something to look forward to 
each day.7 Seth’s mother believes that if Seth had waiver services, he would no longer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1.  Stories, NAT’L ORG. TO END THE WAITLISTS, http://www.noewait.net/stories.html#new (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2013) (arguing that the only option for waiting individuals who need immediate care is an institution 
because institutional care is an entitlement program in the United States, while states are not required to pro-
vide home and community based services).  
 2.  THE ARC OF TENN. & VANDERBILT KENNEDY CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES, TENNESSEE KINDRED STORIES OF DISABILITY SPECIAL EDITION: WAITING LIST FOR HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER SERVICES 12 (2013), available at http://kc.vanderbilt.edu/kennedy_files/ Kin-
dredWaitListStories2013.pdf. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 13. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  THE ARC OF TENN. & VANDERBILT KENNEDY CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES, TENNESSEE KINDRED STORIES OF DISABILITY SPECIAL EDITION: WAITING LIST FOR HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER SERVICES 13 (2013), available at http://kc.vanderbilt.edu/kennedy_files/ Kin-
dredWaitListStories2013.pdf. 
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feel miserable all the time and his behavior would improve.8 Seth qualifies for HCBS, 
but he remains trapped at home9—one of over 300,000 adults and children with intellec-
tual and developmental disabilities (“I/DD”) on waiting lists for HCBS.10 
Waiting lists for HCBS exist because federal statutes allow states to limit the num-
ber of people with I/DD who can receive HCBS.11 Most of those waiting have to choose 
between two unattractive options: entering an institution to receive services, or continu-
ing to wait an unknown amount of time to receive HCBS.12 In Oklahoma, over 7,000 
adults and children with I/DD wait for HCBS.13 With the exception of those facing 
emergencies, an Oklahoman’s waiting period for HCBS currently exceeds eight years.14 
About 4.6 million Americans have an intellectual or developmental disability.15 Intellec-
tual disability (“ID”)16 originates before age eighteen and is characterized by “significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8.  Id. at 13. 
 9.  Id. at 13. 
 10.  Kaiser Family Found., Waiting Lists for Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Ser-
vice (HCBS) Waivers, KFF.ORG, http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/waiting-lists-for-hcbs-waivers-
2010/#notes (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) [hereinafter KFF Waiting] (stating that 316,673 Americans with ID/DD 
were on waiting lists for Medicaid 1915(c) HCBS in 2011). 
 11.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2012); ROBERT M. GETTINGS, FORGING A FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP: A 
HISTORY OF FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES POLICY 115 (2011) (“the budget neutrality formula con-
tained in HCFA’s regulations governing HCB waivers is the only explicit authorization the states have to estab-
lish waiver utilization and expenditure caps”) (quoting THE NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE DIRS. OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES SERVS., HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES AS A MEDICAID STATE PLAN OPTION: 
PRESERVING STATE FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS (1997)). 
 12.  See Elliot Schwalb, Reconsidering Makin v. Hawaii: The Right of Medicaid Beneficiaries to Home-
Based Services as an Alternative to Institutionalization, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 803, 832-33, 849 (2010); see 
Megan Flynn, Article, Olmstead Plans Revisited: Lessons Learned from the U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 28 LAW & INEQ. 407, 417 (2010); Julia Gilmore Gaughan, Comment, Institutionali-
zation as Discrimination: How Medicaid Waivers, the ADA, and § 1983 Fail, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 405, 405, 
418, 437-38 (2008); Melody Kubo, Casenotes, Implementing Olmstead v. L.C.: Defining “Effectively Working” 
Plans for “Reasonably Paced” Wait Lists for Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Pro-
grams, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 731, 754 (2001). 
 13.  Developmental Disabilities Services: Waiver Request Statistics, OKLA. DEP’T HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.okdhs.org/programsandservices/dd/docs/waiting.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) [hereinafter 
OKDHS] (reporting the actual waiting list count as of August 19, 2013 as 7,064).  
 14.  Id. (“Working applications dated April 19, 2005 as of 8/19/13.”). When waivers become available, ap-
plications are processed on a first-come, first-served basis. See Oklahoma In-Home Supports waiver for adults, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html?filterBy=1915(c)#waivers (last visited Mar. 2, 2013): 
In accordance with OAC 317:40-1-1, initiation of services occurs in chronological order 
from the waiting list based on the date of receipt of a written request for services. The in-
dividual must meet the financial and medical eligibility criteria and have critical support 
needs that can be met by the IHSW-A. Exceptions to the chronological requirement may 
be made when an emergency exists.  
Thus, “[w]orking applications dated April 19, 2005 as of 8/19/13” equates to a wait time of eight years and four 
months. 
 15.  Introduction to Intellectual Disabilities, ARC, http://www.thearc.org/page.aspx?pid=2448 (citing S.L. 
Larson et al., Prevalence of Mental Retardation and/or Developmental Disabilities: Analysis of the 1994/1995 
NHIS-D, MR/DD DATA BRIEF (Inst. on Cmty. Integration, Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 2000). 
 16.  Disability terminology changes through the years, often because of negative stereotypes associated with 
disability labels. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Long-Overdue Reform of D.C.’s Antediluvian Developmental Disabili-
ties Law: From Forest Haven to the 21st Century, 13 U. D.C. L. REV. 253 n.12 (2010) (quoting ROBERT L. 
BURGDORF JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 46-47 (1980)). 
Throughout this paper, the term I/DD predominates; older terms including “mental retardation” and “feeble-
minded” are used as necessary for accuracy or clarity, such as in quotations and historical references.  
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limitations both in intellectual functioning (reasoning, learning, problem solving) and in 
adaptive behavior, which covers a range of everyday social and practical skills.”17 De-
velopmental disabilities (“DD”) include ID and other conditions that are primarily physi-
cal issues, such as cerebral palsy and epilepsy.18 A federal statute provides that “individ-
uals with intellectual disabilities or persons with related conditions” may be eligible for 
Medicaid benefits for institutional or HCBS services.19 
This article examines the history of institutional segregation of people with I/DD, 
discusses legal challenges to state waiting lists for Medicaid HCBS waiver20 benefits, 
and argues that federal action must be taken to change the Medicaid HCBS waiver para-
digm so that people with I/DD become fully included in the “mainstream of American 
life.”21 Part II provides background information on the evolution of deinstitutionalization, 
the history of Medicaid long-term supports for people with I/DD, and an overview of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).22 Part III analyzes Olmstead v. L.C. and its 
impact on waiting lists for HCBS services and presents policy arguments in favor of 
eliminating HCBS waiting lists for eligible people with I/DD.23 Part IV concludes that 
resolving the waiting list problem requires federal action, including changing HCBS 
from waiver status to a state plan requirement.24 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM: WAREHOUSED, WAIVERED, AND WAITING 
A. The Evolution of Deinstitutionalization 
Society, moved by pity for some special form of suffering, hastens to 
build up establishments which sometimes increase the very evil which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17.  FAQ on Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-on-intellectual -disability#.Uvvz-ZEzJ8E (last visited Jan. 
10, 2013). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  42 C.F.R. § 435.1010 (2012):  
Persons with related conditions means individuals who have a severe, chronic disability 
that meets all of the following conditions: (a) It is attributable to-- (1) Cerebral palsy or 
epilepsy; or (2) Any other condition, other than mental illness, found to be closely related 
to Intellectual Disability because this condition results in impairment of general intellec-
tual functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that of individuals with intellectual disa-
bilities, and requires treatment or services similar to those required for these persons. (b) 
It is manifested before the person reaches age 22. (c) It is likely to continue indefinitely. 
(d) It results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas 
of major life activity: (1) Self-care. (2) Understanding and use of language. (3) Learning. 
(4) Mobility. (5) Self-direction. (6) Capacity for independent living. 
 20.  Throughout this paper, HCBS waiver(s) refers to Medicaid 1915(c) waivers. 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 
(2012) (“Section 1915(c) of the [Social Security] Act permits States to offer, under a waiver of statutory re-
quirements, an array of home and community-based services that an individual needs to avoid institutionaliza-
tion.”). 
 21.  RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 1 (2005) (quoting President George Herbert Walker Bush, Statement on Signing the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990)). 
 22.  See generally GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 63-123. 
 23.  See generally Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999); GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 
53-60; Schwalb, supra note 12.  
 24.  See Gaughan, supra note 12, at 437.  
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they wished to lessen . . . . [W]here there must be routine and formality, 
and restraint, and repression of individuality, where the chores and re-
fining influences of the true family relation cannot be had, all such in-
stitutions are unnatural, undesirable, and very liable to abuse. We 
should have as few of them as possible, and those few should be kept 
as small as possible. The human family is the unit of society.25 
 
Society’s attitude and actions towards people with I/DD have evolved, sometimes 
in negative directions.26 Throughout the 1800s, people with I/DD were largely ignored 
and left to themselves, based on the prevailing view that the condition was not dangerous 
or curable.27 Education for children with disabilities began with a school for deaf stu-
dents in 1817, and then one for blind students in 1832.28 In 1848, humanitarian concerns 
prompted founders to establish a residential facility to educate children with I/DD, and 
they opened the first public institution of this type, the Massachusetts Asylum for Idiotic 
and Feeble-Minded Youth.29 Thereafter, similar residential institutions arose and shared 
the goal of teaching children with I/DD functional skills to enable them to return to the 
community.30 
By the 1880s, these public institutions began serving younger children with severe 
disabilities and older adults, and the focus shifted to a dual purpose of training and 
providing custody for those with I/DD.31 In the early 1900s, distorted conclusions arose 
from several scientific developments, and society began to view people with I/DD as de-
praved and a threat to the public.32 In the words of Dr. Walter E. Fernald, Superintendent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 25.  PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MR 76 MENTAL RETARDATION: PAST AND PRESENT 5 
(Mary Z. Gray ed., 1977) [hereinafter PC 76] (quoting Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, co-founder of the Massachu-
setts School for Idiotic and Feebleminded Youth, Address at Ceremonies on laying the cornerstone of the N.Y. 
State Inst. for the Blind, at Batavia, New York (Sept. 6, 1866)). 
 26.  Id. at 2. 
We can trace the process by which the first humanitarian efforts of 1850 to educate the 
“poor idiot” and make him socially competent were transformed by 1915 into deliberate 
programs to “identify, segregate, and sterilize every feebleminded person as a menace to 
social decency and racial purity: to the end that they shall not reproduce their kind.” 
 27.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (citing STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 18 (1983)). 
 28.  Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 
1424 (2007) (citing SCOTT B. SIGMON, RADICAL ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 21, 23 (1987)). 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability Rights: Promises, Limits, 
and Issues, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47, 54 (2001); Joanne Karger, Note, “Don’t Tread on the ADA”: Olmstead v. 
L.C. ex rel. Zimring and the Future of Community Integration for Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. 
L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1999) (citing SAMUEL GRIDLEY HOWE, TENTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOL FOR IDIOTIC AND FEEBLE-MINDED YOUTH 11 (1857)). 
 31.  PC 76, supra note 25, at 6 (citing HARVEY B. WILBUR, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1874 (1875)); Karger, 
supra note 30, at 1225 (citing R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION 123 (1983)). 
 32.  See PC 76, supra note 25, at 9 (“Four scientific developments, which became popularized in distorted 
form, helped to fill in the final image of the feebleminded individual as a depraved menace to society: Darwin-
ism, sociological research, Mendelian genetics and psychometry.”); see also Cerreto, supra note 30, at 54 (ex-
plaining that after children became adults, they continued to work at the state schools to protect society from 
“people who would ‘pollute’ the genetics environment of the greater society”); Karger, supra note 30, at 1225 
(noting that medical and academic professionals argued for segregation of people with I/DD to protect society 
	  
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss3/6
	   	  
2014] IMPLEMENTING OLMSTEAD 717 
of the Massachusetts Asylum for Idiotic and Feeble-Minded Youth: 
 
The social and economic burdens of uncomplicated feeblemindedness 
are only too well known. The feebleminded are a parasitic, predatory 
class . . . they cause unutterable sorrow at home and are a menace and 
danger to the community . . . Every feebleminded person, especially the 
highgrade imbecile, is a potential criminal . . . The most important 
point is that feeblemindedness is highly hereditary . . . The normal 
members of a definitely tainted family may transmit defect to their own 
children. Certain families should become extinct.33 
 
Medical and academic professionals promoted this inaccurate view of people with 
I/DD and recommended protecting society by segregating and sterilizing people with 
I/DD.34 In the 1927 decision of Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court reinforced the negative 
stereotype of people with I/DD, stating that “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecili-
ty, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”35 The 
same facilities that had been established to train young people with I/DD to participate in 
community life were transformed into institutions of life-long custody that deprived peo-
ple with I/DD from any participation in the community.36 
Despite I/DD advocates’ efforts to dispel the myth that people with I/DD were 
threats to society, institutional segregation of people with I/DD increased at its fastest 
rate from 1925 to 1950.37 Although advocates were promoting the value of special edu-
cation and adaptations to community life, public facilities housing people with I/DD con-
tinued to grow until 1969, reaching a maximum total population of 190,000.38 These rec-
ord-breaking institutionalization statistics were due, in large part, to medical 
advancements that increased the survival and lifespan of people with I/DD.39 Another 
factor that contributed to the growth of institutionalization was the lack of government or 
community supports for families caring for adult children with I/DD at home.40 Public 
institutions were overcrowded, understaffed, and provided little education and training.41 
Despite the institutions’ deplorable conditions and parental feelings of guilt, waiting lists 
were lengthy because many parents had no other means of securing some type of perma-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from the alleged criminal and sexually immoral propensities of people with I/DD). 
 33.  PC 76, supra note 25, at 11 (quoting W. E. Fernald, The Burden of Feeblemindedness, XVIII J. OF 
PSYCHASTHENICS 90-98 (1912)). 
 34.  PC 76, supra note 25, at 11-12; Cerreto, supra note 30, at 54; Karger, supra note 30, at 1225-26. 
 35.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 36.  See PC 76, supra note 25, at 12. 
 37.  Id. at 15.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  See DEWAYNE L. DAVIS, WENDY FOX-GRAGE & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: A 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR LEGISLATORS 2 (2000); PC 76, supra note 25, at 16.  
 41.  PC 76, supra note 25, at 45.  
5
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nent care for their children with I/DD.42 
In the 1960s, the efforts of parents and other I/DD advocates began to expose the 
appalling conditions of institutional life for children and adults with I/DD.43 Christmas in 
Purgatory, a 1966 photo essay, graphically revealed the horrific daily life that children 
and adults with I/DD endured in a typical I/DD institution: 
 
Many dormitories for the severely and moderately retarded ambulatory 
residents have solitary confinement cells . . . officially referred to as 
“therapeutic isolation.” These cells are . . . generally tiny rooms, ap-
proximately seven feet by seven feet, shielded from the outside with a 
very heavy metal door having either a fine strong screen or metal bars 
for observation of the “prisoner.” Some cells have mattresses, others 
blankets, still others bare floors. None that we had seen (and we found 
these cells in each institution visited) had either a bed, a washstand, or a 
toilet. What we did find in one cell was a thirteen or fourteen year old 
boy, nude, in a corner of a starkly bare room, lying on his own urine 
and feces. The boy had been in solitary confinement for several days 
for committing a minor institutional infraction.44  
 
In addition to seeking improvements in conditions at institutions, advocates began 
to champion deinstitutionalization.45 The process of deinstitutionalization involves three 
elements: releasing people from institutional settings, reducing or preventing admissions 
to institutional settings, and creating or expanding alternative services in the communi-
ty.46 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, various factors strengthened the deinstitutionali-
zation movement.47 Complementing advocates’ work and sociological studies that edu-
cated legislators and the public about institutional abuse, neglect, and inhumane 
conditions, the civil rights movement was growing, and society began placing greater 
emphasis on personal rights and autonomy.48 Professionals began to understand that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 42.  Id. at 16, 21, 42, 45 (indicating that waiting lists were up to one third of the capacity of institutions, and 
turnover was slow). 
 43.  DAVIS, supra note 40, at 2; see PC 76, supra note 25, at 45. 
 44.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
14 n.60. (citing BURTON BLATT & FRED KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY: A PHOTOGRAPHIC ESSAY ON 
MENTAL RETARDATION 3 (1966)).  
 45.  DAVIS, supra note 40, at 2; see PC 76, supra note 25, at 2; Samantha A. DiPolito, Comment, Olmstead 
v. L.C.—Deinstitutionalization and Community Integration: An Awakening of the Nation’s Conscience?, 58 
MERCER L. REV. 1381, 1385 (2007); Karger, supra note 30, at 1226-27; Sandra L. Yue, Article, A Return to 
Institutionalization Despite Olmstead v. L.C.? The Inadequacy of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement in Minne-
sota and the Failure to Deliver Home-and Community-Based Waiver Services, 19 LAW & INEQ. 307, 313 
(2001). 
 46.  Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and Trou-
blesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1446 (2005). 
 47.  See PC 76, supra note 25, at 45; DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1385; Karger, supra note 30, at 1226; Yue, 
supra note 45, at 313.  
 48.  PC 76, supra note 25, at 45; DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1385; Karger, supra note 30, at 1226; Yue, su-
pra note 45, at 313.  
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people with I/DD could improve and benefit from living in less restrictive environ-
ments.49 Further, legislators and public officials held economic motives, recognizing the 
high cost of maintaining aging institutions and the necessity of building new facilities to 
accommodate those on waiting lists.50 
The 1970s brought both hope and disappointment to disability advocates, as judi-
cial interpretations squelched legislation that had great potential to promote deinstitu-
tionalization and government support for community services.51 High hopes sprung from 
the enactment of the first broad federal statute to address discrimination against people 
with disabilities—section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)—which 
was regarded as “the civil rights bill of the disabled.”52 Section 504 stated that “[n]o oth-
erwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason 
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial as-
sistance.”53 Hopes dimmed, however, when federal courts refused to interpret the preced-
ing provision of Section 504 as a requirement that states provide services for people with 
I/DD in the least restrictive environment.54 
Like Section 504, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
of 1975 (“DDA”)55 generated unfulfilled hopes regarding enforcement of the civil rights 
of people with disabilities.56 The bill of rights provision of the DDA states that people 
with I/DD “have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation . . . [in] the 
setting that is least restrictive of . . . personal liberty.”57 However, in 1981, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the DDA bill of rights did not provide those with I/DD “any substantive 
rights to ‘appropriate treatment’ in the ‘least restrictive’ environment.’”58 
Despite the judicial setbacks, the deinstitutionalization movement continued to in-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 49.  Yue, supra note 45, at 313.  
 50.  Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 
31 EMORY L.J. 375, 381-82 (1982) (citing ANDREW SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND 
THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW 2 (1977) (noting that Scull argued that economic factors were the primary 
motive for deinstitutionalization)). 
 51.  See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 
393, 393-95 (1991); Sharaya L. Cabansag, Note, Defending Access to Community-Based Services for Individu-
als with Developmental Disabilities in the Wake of the “Great Recession,” 55 HOW. L.J. 1025, 1041 (2012) 
(“Despite Congress’ clear intent to effect the full integration of individuals with disabilities, judicial interpreta-
tions of the ADA have incorporated a cost-based analysis to decide the extent to which the ADA will be en-
forced.”). 
 52.  Cabansag, supra note 51, at 1030; DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1385-86; Laura C. Scotellaro, Note, The 
Mandated Move from Institutions to Community Care: Olmstead v. L.C., 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 737, 743-44 
(2000). 
 53.  Pub. L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)). 
 54.  DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1385-86 (citing P.C. v. McGlaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the state did not have an affirmative duty 
under the Rehab Act to create less restrictive community residential settings for persons with disabilities)). 
 55.  Cook, supra note 51, at 395 (citing Pub. L. No. 94 103, 89 Stat. 486 (42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1970 & Supp. 
1975)) (current version codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)). 
 56.  See Cook, supra note 51, at 395; Cabansag, supra note 51, at 1031. 
 57.  Cook, supra note 51, at 395 (quoting Pub. L. No. 94 103, 89 Stat. 486 (42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1970 & Supp. 
1975)) (current version codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)). 
 58.  Cook, supra note 51, at 395 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 10 (1981)). 
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tensify as it received support from disparate sources: disability advocates, academic re-
search, the civil rights movement, liberal legislators, and fiscal conservatives.59 Disabil-
ity advocates continued to promote development of income, housing, and community 
supports so that individuals with I/DD could be successfully integrated into their com-
munities.60 Additionally, research studies of people who had moved from institutions in-
to the community revealed numerous beneficial outcomes such as greater competence in 
daily living skills and decision making and increased independence, dignity, and rela-
tionships with others.61 Cost studies also confirmed the superiority of deinstitutionaliza-
tion, generating support from fiscally conservative legislators and public officials.62 
“[Deinstitutionalization] permitted liberal politicians to free mental patients, and at the 
same time allowed conservative politicians to save millions of dollars.”63 
Statistics demonstrate the impact of the deinstitutionalization movement, as the 
population of people with I/DD living in large public facilities decreased by 76.7 percent 
from 1980 to 2010.64 By 2012, fourteen states had closed all public institutions for 
I/DD.65 Although Oklahoma currently operates two institutions for people with I/DD, the 
Human Services Commission (“HSC”) voted in 2012 to transition the institutional resi-
dents into community homes and close both institutions within two years.66 Oklahoma 
established both institutions over a century ago, and the facilities need millions of dollars 
in repairs and upgrades to maintain certification by the Department of Health.67 While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 59.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 20-21 (describing the importance of deinstitutionalization advocates’ 
alliance with fiscal conservatives); DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1385-88 (describing support deinstitutionaliza-
tion advocates gained from civil rights movement, academic research); Karger, supra note 30, at 1226 (discuss-
ing how deinstitutionalization advocates gained momentum from the civil rights movement and from sociolog-
ical studies exposing institutional abuse and neglect); Rhoden, supra note 50, at 382 (discussing support for 
deinstitutionalization from liberal politicians and fiscal conservatives). 
 60.  Yue, supra note 45, at 313. 
 61.  Research and Training Ctr. on Cmty. Living, Univ. of Minn., Behavioral Outcomes of Deinstitutionali-
zation for People with Intellectual and/or Developmental Disabilities: Third Decennial Review of U.S. Studies, 
1977-2010, POL. RES. BRIEF (Research and Training Ctr. on Cmty. Living, Inst. On Cmty. Integration, Coll. of 
Educ. & Human Dev., Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 2011, at 3-8 [hereinafter Cmty. Living]; 
DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1388; Karger, supra note 30, at 1227.  
 62.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 20-21; DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1387-88. 
 63.  Rhoden, supra note 50, at 382 (quoting Gary J. Clarke, In Defense of Deinstitutionalization, 57 
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 461, 468 (1979)). 
 64.  SHERYL LARSON, AMANDA RYAN, PATRICIA SALMI, DREW SMITH, & ALLISE WUORIO, RESIDENTIAL 
SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: STATUS AND TRENDS THROUGH 2010, at iii 
(2012). 
 65.  NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EXPLORING NEW PARADIGMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES ASSISTANCE AND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT: SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2011 NCD PUBLICATION RISING 
EXPECTATIONS: THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ACT REVISITED 74, 88 (2012) [hereinafter NCD 2011] 
(listing the states which have closed all ICF/IIDs: “District of Columbia (1991), New Hampshire (1991), Ver-
mont (1993), Rhode Island (1994), Alaska (1997), New Mexico (1997), West Virginia (1998), Hawaii (1999), 
Maine (1999), Minnesota (2000), Indiana (2007), Michigan (2009), Oregon (2009), and Alabama (2012)”).   
 66.  News Release, Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., Human Services Commission Votes to Approve Communi-
ty Services Initiative for People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities [hereinafter OKDHS HSC] 
(Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.okdhs.org/library/news/ rel/2012/11/comm11012012b.htm. 
 67.  Id.  
Both NORCE [Northern Oklahoma Resource Center of Enid] and SORC [Southern Ok-
lahoma Resource Center in Pauls Valley] were established more than 100 years ago when 
that was the only option for providing care to people with intellectual and developmental 
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these institutions held over two thousand residents at their peak, they currently house less 
than two hundred and fifty people.68 In announcing the HSC’s decision to close the insti-
tutions, the HSC Chairman explained that “[c]ommunity services offer more personal-
ized care and a higher quality of life to individuals, making institutional care a thing of 
the past.”69 
Advocacy efforts have been highly successful in achieving two of the three ele-
ments of deinstitutionalization: moving people with I/DD out of large institutions and 
into the community and reducing or preventing admissions to institutions.70 But the ulti-
mate goal of deinstitutionalization, community integration of people with I/DD, requires 
the third element—a robust system of community supports for people with I/DD.71 Ad-
vocates still have yet to succeed in replacing institutions with consistent, widespread 
community support systems that will allow people with I/DD to thrive in their communi-
ties.72 The difficulties in establishing and maintaining essential community-based ser-
vices threaten the future of deinstitutionalization.73 
B. Medicaid’s Role in Deinstitutionalization 
In 1965, Congress created Medicaid as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to 
provide health care services to welfare beneficiaries, including people with disabilities.74 
Medicaid, a federal-state partnership program jointly funded by the federal and state 
governments, assigns specific roles to federal and state agencies to design and pay for 
each state’s program.75 Federal statutes, regulations, and policies establish broad national 
guidelines.76 Within these guidelines, the states have flexibility in deciding what benefits 
to provide, who will be eligible, and how much health care providers will be paid.77 Be-
cause of the discretion given to the states, eligibility and services vary considerably from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disabilities. SORC was opened in 1907 and originally known as the “State Training 
School for White Boys,” and NORCE opened in 1909 as the “Oklahoma Institute for the 
Feeble Minded.” 
 68.  Id. (“At the height of institutional care in Oklahoma, both facilities housed more than 1,000 residents . . 
. . Today, SORC has 123 residents and NORCE has 108.”). 
 69.  Id.  
“We realize this is an emotional decision involving change for the residents and their 
families as well as the employees of the facilities,” said Wes Lane, Chairman of the Hu-
man Services Commission. “We determined after studying this issue in depth for the bet-
ter part of a year that this is the right decision at the right time. DDSD has spent the past 
20 years developing a comprehensive community service system that provides care and 
support to the vast majority of people receiving services who have all levels of disabili-
ties,” said Lane. “Community services offer more personalized care and a higher quality 
of life to individuals, making institutional care a thing of the past.” 
 70.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 6-8; Weithorn, supra note 46, at 1446 (defining deinstitutionalization). 
 71.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 6, 12-13. 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 
2012, at 57 (2013) [hereinafter SSA BULLETIN]. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
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state to state.78 Further, state legislatures may revise Medicaid eligibility, services, or re-
imbursement at any time.79 
The federal government contributes at least half of each state’s Medicaid expendi-
tures.80 Every year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) calculates 
the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”) for each state based upon its rela-
tive wealth; states with lower per capita income receive higher FMAPs.81 While FMAPs 
can range from 50 percent to 83 percent, the overall average for all states was 58.8 per-
cent for fiscal year 2012.82 For the past five fiscal years, Oklahoma’s FMAP ranged from 
a high of 67.1 percent for 2008 to a low of 63.88 percent for 2012.83 
An essential part of the U.S. health care system, Medicaid provides coverage for 
about one-fifth of the American population.84 In 2009, nearly 800,000 Oklahomans were 
among the nation’s 62.7 million Medicaid enrollees.85 That same year, total Medicaid 
expenditures exceeded $4 billion for Oklahomans, and nearly $400 billion for the entire 
country.86 People with disabilities represented about 14 percent of Oklahoma’s Medicaid 
enrollees and about 15 percent of U.S. enrollees.87 Reflecting the higher medical and 
health-related service needs of those with disabilities, these enrollees generated about 42 
percent of Medicaid costs.88 
Medicaid plays a critical role in the provision of long-term services and supports 
for people with I/DD, paying over three-fourths the costs for long-term services.89 In ad-
dition, Medicaid regulations strongly affect states’ decisions regarding available supports 
and delivery of services.90 Sadly, the institutional bias of the Medicaid program,91 as dis-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 57. 
 80.  Id. at 61. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.   Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid for fiscal year 2008, for the Department of Health and Human 
Services, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,209, 69,210 (Nov. 30, 2006); Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid for fiscal year 
2009, for the Department of Health and Human Services, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,304-67,306 (Nov. 28, 2007); Federal 
Matching Shares for Medicaid for fiscal year 2010, for the Department of Health and Human Services, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 72,051-72,052 (Nov. 26, 2008); Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid for fiscal year 2011, for the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,315-62.316 (Nov. 27, 2010); Federal Matching 
Shares for Medicaid for fiscal year 2012, for the Department of Health and Human Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 
69,082-69,083 (Nov. 10, 2010). 
 84.  See Vernon K. Smith et al., Medicaid Today; Preparing for Tomorrow: A Look at State Medicaid Pro-
gram Spending, Enrollment and Policy Trends—Results from a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fis-
cal Years 2012 and 2013 (Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8380.pdf (62 million 
Americans are enrolled in Medicaid); U.S. Population Clock, CENSUS.GOV (Mar. 5, 2013, 2:32 PM), 
http://www.census.gov/main/ www/popclock.html (U.S. population is 315,439,607; 62 million of 312 million 
Americans are enrolled in Medicaid, or about one-fifth of all Americans). 
 85.  Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid & CHIP Facts At-A-Glance, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparecat.jsp?cat=4&rgn=38&rgn=1&print=1 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 63. 
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cussed in Part III, continues to limit availability of community services and supports that 
would allow people with disabilities to avoid institutionalization and live as integral 
members of their communities.92 Two elements of Medicaid significantly interwoven 
with the deinstitutionalization movement are Medicaid’s regulations regarding interme-
diate care facilities and home and community-based services.93 
1.  Intermediate Care Facilities 
Congress enacted Medicaid in July of 1965, and funds became available to the 
states on January 1, 1966.94 States could choose whether to participate in Medicaid and 
could also implement the program in phases.95 Only six states implemented Medicaid in 
1966, yet the cost that year exceeded the amount estimated to be sufficient to cover full 
participation by every state.96 In an attempt to control the rapid rise in costs, Congress 
amended the program in 1967.97 These amendments included the creation of a new level 
of institutional care—an intermediate care facility (“ICF”) for Medicaid beneficiaries 
who required less intensive care than that of Medicaid-certified skilled nursing homes.98 
The legislature believed that payment for ICF services would reduce overall costs by 
avoiding the use of more expensive skilled nursing homes when a reduced level of care 
would suffice.99 In addition, the ICFs would provide a benefit to Medicaid beneficiaries 
who did not qualify for skilled nursing home care but required care in a sheltered set-
ting.100 
Unintended consequences soon resulted from this ICF legislation, as states found 
various ways to take advantage of it by reclassifying facilities to obtain more federal 
Medicaid funding for state programs.101 Up to this point, federal matching funds had 
been unavailable to share the cost of states’ public institutions for people with I/DD, but 
several states sought to classify these I/DD institutions as ICFs to gain federal money.102 
Congress worked on legislative remedies to prevent states from using the ICF provision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[hereinafter ICF/IID MEDICAID] (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 91.  See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text. 
 92.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 2004 YALE L.J. 1, 61-62; Cabansag, supra note 51, 
at 1047; Loretta Williams, Note, Long Term Care after Olmstead v. L.C.: Will the Potential of the ADA’s Inte-
gration Mandate be Achieved?, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 205, 210-16 (2000). 
 93.  See generally DAVIS, supra note 40, at 2-15; GETTINGS, supra note 11; PC 76, supra note 25, at 164 
(Mary Z. Gray, ed., 1977).  
 94.  Tracing the History of CMS Programs: From President Theodore Roosevelt to President George W. 
Bush, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-
Information/History/downloads/presidentcmsmilestones.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
 95.  See GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 64-65.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 65. 
 98.  Id. at 65-66. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 66. 
 101.  Id. (describing state tactics such as reclassifying skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) as ICFs to avoid the 
stricter certification requirements for SNFs, reimbursing ICFs at higher rates than SNFs even though ICFs pro-
vided a lower level of care and should have been more cost-effective, and classifying ineligible facilities as 
ICFs in order to receive federal funding). 
 102.  Id. 
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in unanticipated ways that increased Medicaid spending.103 In 1970, legislators proposed 
several bills to revise the Medicaid ICF provision, but after heated debate, they were un-
able to reach agreement.104 As the congressional session neared an end in 1971, the Sen-
ate Finance Committee chose several provisions of a proposed bill for expedited ac-
tion.105 Then, Oklahoma’s senators Henry Bellmon and Fred Harris attached language 
authorizing a new Medicaid option, intermediate care facilities for individuals with I/DD 
(“ICF/IID”), to an unrelated bill.106 The Senate passed the bill without debate or congres-
sional hearings, and the House of Representatives accepted the bill.107 On December 28, 
1971, President Nixon signed the bill that included the ICF/IID provision, and the law 
went into effect on January 1, 1972.108 
The passage of the ICF/IID provision resulted from two combined forces: I/DD 
advocates who wanted substantial improvements to the institutions’ physical facilities as 
well as the programs and care provided within the facilities, and state governments that 
sought a reliable source of federal funding for these public I/DD institutions.109 The 
ICF/IID amendment provided federal funds with the stipulation that states agree not to 
reduce state expenditures for patients in the institutions, reflecting congressional intent to 
assist the states in upgrading the infamously poor quality of care in public I/DD institu-
tions.110 Prior to the amendment’s passage, a number of states, including Oklahoma, had 
been submitting Medicaid claims for their I/DD institutions.111 Because the federal gov-
ernment questioned the legitimacy of these claims, the states risked losing future federal 
contributions to institutional funding and risked having to repay millions of dollars in 
back claims for institutional funds they received from the federal government.112 Lloyd 
Rader, director of the Oklahoma Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services from 
1951 to 1982, worked with federal officials and a national I/DD advocacy group to con-
struct the ICF/IID legislation and successfully lobby legislators for its passage.113 
The ICF/IID amendment stated that “the primary purpose of [an ICF/IID] is to 
provide health or rehabilitative services for mentally retarded individuals [that] meet 
such standards as may be prescribed by the Secretary.”114 The inclusion of “rehabilitative 
services” was significant for two reasons: it was the first time that Congress authorized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 103.  Id. at 66-67. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 67. 
 106.  Id. Originally referred to as Intermediate Care Facilities for Persons with Mental Retardation 
(ICF/MRs), these facilities are now referred to as Intermediate Care Facilities for Individuals with Intellectual 
Disabilities (ICF/IIDs). See  C.F.R. T. 42, ch. IV, subch. G, pt. 483, subpt. I. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  See K. Charlie Lakin, Bradley Hill &Robert Bruininks, An Analysis of Medicaid’s Intermediate Care 
Facility for the Mentally Retarded (ICF-MR) Program, CTR. FOR RESIDENTIAL AND CMTY. SERVS., UNIV. OF 
MINN.,  1-1 (1985) [hereinafter RESIDENTIAL].  
 109.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 67. 
 110.  RESIDENTIAL, supra note 108, at 1-25, 1-26. 
 111.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 68-69. 
 112.  Id. at 69. 
 113.  Id. at 70. 
 114.  RESIDENTIAL, supra note 108, at 1-24 (quoting Pub. L. No. 92-223) (emphasis added). 
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federal Medicaid funds for institutional care that was not primarily medical or “health 
related,” and it emphasized congressional intent that institutions focus on training and 
habilitation as opposed to “custodial” care.115 In 1974, the Social and Rehabilitation Ser-
vice (“SRS”) of the Federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) is-
sued regulations clarifying this provision.116 The regulations defined the requirement for 
ICF/IIDs to provide “active treatment” so that each person participates regularly in ther-
apies, activities, or experiences based on an individualized professionally developed plan 
of care designed to assist the person in achieving his or her potential in physical, intellec-
tual, social, and vocational functioning.117 
The enactment of the ICF/IID provision led to a number of rulings and regulations 
by the SRS establishing requirements that state I/DD institutions would have to satisfy to 
be eligible for Federal Medicaid funding.118 From 1972 to 1988, the SRS issued a series 
of regulations prescribing minimum facility standards to ensure safety and sanitation as 
well as rules regarding required services.119 Initially, states had until 1977 to comply 
with the standards; however, later compromises between state and HEW officials led to 
revised standards and extended the compliance deadline until 1978, then 1982, and final-
ly 1987.120 
The ICF/IID standards exceeded the requirements for general ICFs.121 Consequent-
ly, compliance necessitated costly physical renovations to state institutions, generating 
battles between the HEW and a number of states, including Oklahoma.122 After unsuc-
cessful negotiations with HEW officials, Lloyd Rader responded by having Oklahoma’s 
three public I/DD institutions reclassified as general ICFs to avoid compliance with the 
stricter ICF/IID requirements.123 
By the 1970s, following decades of growth, increased demand for community-
based services combined with the cost of compliance with ICF/IID regulations led some 
states to reduce the population of their public I/DD facilities.124 The total number of peo-
ple living in large public I/DD institutions declined over 40 percent between 1974 and 
1986.125 Originally, the CMS126 proposed ICF/IID regulations suitable for the operation 
of large institutions, raising concerns among advocacy groups that this institutional em-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 115.  Id. at 1-26, 1-27. 
 116.  See GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 72-73; RESIDENTIAL, supra note 108, at 1-28, 1-29.  
 117.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 72-73; RESIDENTIAL, supra note 108, at 1-28, 1-29. 
 118.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 71-73. 
 119.  See id. at 71-78. 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  Id. at 73-74. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 74. 
 124.  Id. at 76.  
 125.  Id. at 76 (citing Kathryn Coucouvanis et al., Current Populations and Longitudinal Trends of State Res-
idential Settings (1950-2006), in RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: 
STATUS AND TRENDS THROUGH 2006 (R. W. Prouty et al. eds., 2007)). 
 126.  Throughout this article, “CMS” refers to the agency responsible for operating the Medicaid program, 
although CMS was formerly the Health Care Financing Administration. 
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phasis would detract from the development of community residential alternatives.127 The 
CMS modified the ICF/IID requirements slightly in response to these concerns, but most 
states were initially reluctant to seek ICF/IID certification for small community-based 
residences serving people with I/DD.128 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CMS issued guidelines that encouraged 
states to expand the number of smaller community-based ICF/IIDs.129 As a result of 
growing consumer demand and the federal guidelines, the proportion of ICF/IID resi-
dents living in community facilities, rather than large public institutions, rose from just 6 
percent in 1982 to over 34 percent in 1997.130 Thus, the ICF/IID policy, originally enact-
ed to improve physical conditions and programming in massive public I/DD institutions, 
became an instrument of deinstitutionalization; large public facilities downsized or 
closed, and more people with I/DD lived in smaller community residences operated by 
private nonprofit organizations.131 From 1982 to 2010, the number of people with I/DD 
living in large state ICF/IIDs shrank from 107,081 to 30,481.132 
2. Home and Community-Based Services 
Until 1981, individuals with I/DD could only receive Medicaid coverage for long-
term supports if they lived in institutions.133 The enactment of Medicaid HCBS waiver 
authority, buried in legislation designed to slash federal spending on social programs, 
brought profound and lasting impact to the delivery of services to people with I/DD.134 
The HCBS waiver authority allows states to use federal Medicaid matching funds to 
support individuals in their communities rather than in institutions.135 The increase in 
number of people with I/DD receiving HCBS waivers—from fewer than 50,000 in 1990 
to more than a half million beneficiaries in 2010—reflects the shift from institutional 
care to community care.136 
Like the ICF/IID legislation, the HCBS waiver authority resulted from an unlikely 
alliance between I/DD advocates and fiscal conservatives.137 While the HCBS waivers 
advanced I/DD advocates’ goals of incentivizing states to expand community services 
and move people out of institutions,138 the waiver’s primary rationale was the cost effec-
tiveness of replacing expensive institutional care with economical services provided in 
homes and in the community.139 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 127.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 79. 
 128.  Id. at 80. 
 129.  Id. at 80-81. 
 130.  Id. at 81. 
 131.  Id. at 82; RESIDENTIAL, supra note 108, at 1-31. 
 132.  LARSON, supra note 64, at 99. 
 133.  Karger, supra note 30, at 1229.  
 134.  See GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 85, 92 
 135.  Karger, supra note 30, at 1229. 
 136.  LARSON, supra note 64, at 109. 
 137.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 67, 92; see Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 20. 
 138.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 6. 
 139.  E.g., GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 92. 
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Following months of negotiations and debate between President Reagan and both 
houses of Congress regarding the budget, deficit reduction, and social policies, the House 
and Senate ratified the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (“OBRA-81”) in Ju-
ly of that year.140 OBRA-81 includes the HCBS waiver authority—language authorizing 
the head of the CMS to approve state waiver applications so that states can receive feder-
al matching funds to pay for nonmedical services required to prevent institutionaliza-
tion.141 Services covered under an HCBS waiver may include “case management, 
homemaker, home health aide, personal care, adult day health, habilitation, respite care, 
and ‘such other services requested by the state as the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) may approve.’”142 
In addition to waiving the general requirement that federal Medicaid funds are lim-
ited to services provided for “medical assistance,”143 the HCBS waiver authority permits 
the CMS to waive two other Medicaid provisions, the “comparability” and “statewide-
ness” requirements.144 The comparability requirement requires states to make Medicaid 
services available to all eligible individuals on an equivalent basis.145 The statewideness 
provision requires the state Medicaid plan to be effective throughout the state.146 Waiv-
ing these two provisions allows states to target specific groups at risk of institutionaliza-
tion and to experiment with various services and delivery methods.147 
 
The bill permits the secretary to waive the current definition of covered 
Medicaid services to include certain nonmedical support services, other 
than room and board, which are provided pursuant to a plan of care to 
an individual otherwise at risk of being institutionalized and who 
would, in the absence of such services be institutionalized. . . . The 
committee expects that states [that] have been granted a waiver will ex-
amine innovative and cost-efficient means of rendering services to this 
population group.148 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 140.  Id. at 90. 
 141.  Janet O’Keeffe et al., Understanding Medicaid Home and Community Services: A Primer, OFFICE OF 
THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 28 (2010) 
[hereinafter PRIMER]; GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 90.  
 142.  PRIMER, supra note 141, at 28. 
 143.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2012). 
 144.  PRIMER, supra note 141, at 72. 
 145.  Id. at 91, 72  
[S]ervices covered under a state’s Medicaid plan . . . must be available on a comparable 
basis to all state Medicaid beneficiaries (in an eligibility group) who need the service. 
States must use the same eligibility criteria for all applicants and any limits on service 
amount, scope, and duration must be equally applied to both individuals currently receiv-
ing services and those applying for services. 
 146.  Id. at 72, 91 (“The Statewideness Requirement [:] States cannot restrict the availability of State Plan 
services to particular geographic regions.”).  
 147.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 91. 
 148.  Schwalb, supra note 12, at 808 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 97-208, at 481-82 (1981), reprinted in 1981 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 396, 747-48). 
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Consistent with the legislative intent to encourage state innovation in providing 
noninstitutional services, the CMS issued minimal regulations so that states would have 
substantial flexibility to design and operate their waiver programs, explaining “we will 
measure the states’ proposals against the statutory requirements rather than against a de-
tailed additional set of Federal guidelines or criteria.”149 In addition to promoting innova-
tive community service programs, legislators were concerned with cost savings.150 Thus, 
two elements that states must satisfy to qualify for HCBS waivers reflect fiscal con-
cerns.151 First, states must limit eligibility to individuals who would, absent HCBS ser-
vices, require institutional care.152 Second, the waiver programs must be “budget neutral” 
i.e., the average per capita cost of the alternative HCBS services cannot exceed the aver-
age per capita cost for institutional care.153 
The CMS approved the first HCBS waiver in December 1981, followed by ap-
proval of more than twenty waivers in 1982, with an additional twenty-one requests 
pending action.154 Four factors explained the immediate popularity of the programs.155 
First, the increasing acceptance of deinstitutionalization policies stimulated community-
based supports.156 Second, federal ICF/IID standards required states to downsize institu-
tions.157 Third, class action lawsuits resulting in settlement agreements and court orders 
also forced the downsizing and closure of large state facilities.158 Finally, because most 
states were already using public funds to develop community supports, they welcomed 
the opportunity to capitalize on their investments by capturing federal funds with HCBS 
waivers.159 
The federal government lacked the states’ enthusiasm for federal funding of waiver 
services.160 Under pressure from the White House Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”), the CMS tightened its scrutiny of waiver requests and implemented an unwrit-
ten “cold bed” rule requiring states to show that institutional capacity would be reduced 
equivalent to the number of estimated waiver beneficiaries.161 From 1982 through 1985, 
the CMS and the OMB toughened and lengthened the waiver approval process.162 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 149.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 93 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 48,533 (Oct. 1, 1981)). 
 150.  See id. at 91. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 94-95. 
 155.  See id. 
 156.  Id. at 94. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 95. 
 160.  See id. 
 161.  Steven Lutzky et al., Review of the Medicaid 1915(c) Home and Community Based Services Waiver 
Program Literature and Program Data2 (2000), available at 
http://www.lewin.com/~/media/Lewin/Site_Sections/Publications/582.pdf (“Shortly after the start of the pro-
gram, to meet the cost neutrality requirement, states had to demonstrate that a bed in a Medicaid-certified insti-
tution was available or would be available if a certificate of need (CON) request were filed for each waiver 
participant (the so-called “cold bed” requirement).”). 
 162.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 95-97. 
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CMS officials announced they would withhold waiver approval unless states demon-
strated that the waiver program would reduce total Medicaid expenditures by twenty or 
twenty-five percent, a baseless requirement that contradicted statutory intent.163 Accord-
ing to one congressman, the administration was “strangling the Medicaid waiver pro-
gram with Byzantine regulations.”164 In 1986, Congress passed legislation that provided 
some relief from the CMS/OMB’s restrictive approval procedures.165 However, the cold 
bed rule remained in effect until 1994, when the CMS simplified the cost neutrality for-
mula and reporting requirements.166 Under the revised formula, the CMS evaluates the 
cost neutrality of a state’s waiver request based on average per capita costs with and 
without waiver services regardless of the number of waiver recipients, although states 
must still specify the maximum number of waiver enrollees.167 
The retirement of the cold bed rule accompanied a second significant deinstitution-
alization milestone in 1994—annual spending for Medicaid HCBS exceeded spending 
for ICF/IIDs for the first time.168 This trend toward community supports and away from 
institutions has continued.169 The waiver program that began with eight waivers in six 
states in 1982 expanded to 214 waivers in twenty-nine states by 1999.170 By 2008, forty-
eight states and the District of Columbia were managing 314 HCBS waiver programs.171 
That same year, state spending for HCBS was nearly double that of ICF/IID spending, 
and more than five times as many people with I/DD received HCBS than resided in 
ICF/IIDs.172 
In a complete reversal from the first decade of HCBS waivers, the federal govern-
ment now provides incentives for states to expand HCBS offerings, while many states 
have applied the fiscal brakes.173 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 163.  Id. at 96 
 164.  Id. at 97. 
 165.  Id. at 98. 
 166.  Id. at 100 (“[t]he cost-effectiveness of a waiver request was to be assessed solely on the basis of average 
per capita costs with and without the proposed waiver services.”); LUTZKY, supra note 161, at 3. 
 167.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 100. 
 168.  See id. at 122. 
 169.  See id. 
 170.  Charlene Harrington et al., Home & Community Based Services: Public Policies to Improve Access, 
Costs, and Quality 2 (2009), available at http://www.pascenter.org/documents/PASCenter_HCBS_policy_brief.pdf. 
 171.  PRIMER, supra note 141, at 29: 
During Federal fiscal year (FFY) 2008, 48 states and the District of Columbia operated 
314 HCBS waiver programs. This number includes waivers that CMS had approved but 
that had not yet been implemented as of September 30, 2008. The two states that did not 
have HCBS waivers—Arizona and Vermont—provided similar services as part of Re-
search and Demonstration waivers authorized by §1115 of the Social Security Act. Ex-
penditures for waiver services totaled $30 billion in 2008 and roughly three-fourths was 
used to purchase services and supports for persons with developmental disabilities, in-
cluding persons with autism spectrum disorders or intellectual disabilities Almost all oth-
er waiver expenditures in the same year were for older adults and younger adults with 
physical disabilities; a few smaller population groups accounted for the remaining waiver 
expenditures. 
 172.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 122. 
 173.  See id. at 117-122; Schwalb, supra note 12, at 808. 
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(“PPACA”) contains a number of inducements for states to expand community services 
as an alternative to institutionalization and to provide community supports through pro-
grams that do not limit the number of beneficiaries.174 While Medicaid law requires 
states to provide institutional services to all eligible individuals as a mandatory benefit, 
provision of HCBS is optional, and states may limit eligibility for HCBS.175 Despite in-
creasing demand for HCBS, states’ fiscal crises have prevailed over federal incentives 
such that few states are willing to provide community services on a full open-ended enti-
tlement basis.176 
When approving HCBS waivers, the CMS gives states wide discretion regarding 
choice of community service offerings and beneficiaries.177 Thus, available services, per 
capita expenditures, and HCBS participation vary widely from state to state.178 For ex-
ample, states with the highest per capita expenditure spend nearly seven times as much 
for each HCBS recipient as those with the lowest per capita spending.179 In at least ten 
states, people with I/DD are able to receive HCBS waivers promptly.180 However, a lack 
of waiting lists is the exception, as most states have failed to accommodate the growth in 
demand for HCBS.181 As a result, more people with I/DD are waiting, and are waiting 
longer periods, to receive HCBS.182 
In 2009, an estimated 564,836 people with I/DD received HCBS waivers, while 
221,898 people with I/DD remained on waiting lists for HCBS.183 Texas had the largest 
waiting lists, with over 129,500 people waiting for waivers in 2009.184 Oklahoma had the 
longest wait time, an average of over five years.185 By 2011, HCBS waiting lists had 
grown to include more than 300,000 Americans with I/DD.186 Oklahoma continues to 
have the longest wait time, and Oklahomans with I/DD now wait an average of over 
eight years for HCBS waivers.187 HCBS provides the principal means of care for many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 174.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 117-18.  
 175.  ICF/IID MEDICAID, supra note 90; Harrington et al., supra note 170, at 1. 
 176.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 120, Harrington et al., supra note 170, at viii. 
 177.  See Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv, 4-6. 
 178.  See id. 
 179.  State Options That Expand Access to Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services, Kaiser Comm’n 
on Medicaid & the Uninsured, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,  4 (2011), available at 
http://kff.org/medicaid/report/state-options-that-expand-access-to-medicaid/. 
 180.  Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Programs: 2009 Data Update, Kaiser Comm’n on 
Medicaid & the Uninsured, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 11 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-home-and-community-based-service-programs/ [hearinafter KAISER]. 
 181.  See id.; Gary Smith, John Agosta & Jon Fortune, Gauging the Use of HCBS Support Waivers for Peo-
ple with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: Final Project Report, Office of Disability, Aging, and 
Long-Term Care Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,  10-11 (2007), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2007/gaugingfr.htm. 
 182.  See KAISER, supra note 180, at 3, 11; SMITH, supra note 181, at 10; Harrington et al., supra note 170, at 
12-13. 
 183.  Terence Ng & Charlene Harrington, Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Service Programs: A Data 
Update 6 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/ medicaid/upload/LTC-Slides-02-07-2011.pdf.  
 184.  Id. This figure is for all HCBS waivers in Texas for people with I/DD, and other elderly and disabled. 
 185.  Id. 	  	  186.	  	  	  KFF	  Waiting,	  supra	  note	  10.	  	  	  
 187.  OKDHS, supra note 13 (“Working applications dated April 19, 2005 as of 8/19/13.”). When waivers 
become available, applications are processed on a first-come, first-served basis. See Oklahoma In-Home Sup-
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people with I/DD, yet waiting lists force individuals to choose between institutionaliza-
tion and going without assistance necessary for basic activities of everyday life.188 Twen-
ty-five states have faced legal action from citizens with I/DD on waiting lists for HCBS, 
resulting in a number of settlement agreements in which the states have agreed to expand 
HCBS availability.189 
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
Today, I am signing S. 933, the “Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990.” In this extraordinary year, we have seen our own Declaration of 
Independence inspire the march of freedom throughout Eastern Europe. 
It is altogether fitting that the American people have once again given 
clear expression to our most basic ideals of freedom and equality. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act represents the full flowering of our 
democratic principles. . . . [and] presents us all with an historic oppor-
tunity. It signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of 
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. As the 
Declaration of Independence has been a beacon for people all over the 
world seeking freedom, it is my hope that the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act will likewise come to be a model for the choices and opportu-
nities of future generations around the world. 
—President George H.W. Bush190 
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) differed from other major civil 
rights legislation because it was drafted in greater detail than any prior civil rights legis-
lation, and it faced no serious opposition.191 The ADA began with a report from the 1986 
National Council on Disability, “Toward Independence,” that proposed broad legislation 
to extend federal civil rights laws to include people with disabilities.192 Senator Lowell 
Connecticut, parent of a child with Down syndrome, introduced the first version of the 
ADA on April 28, 1988.193 Congress spent several years discussing and revising the leg-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ports waiver for adults, available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html?filterBy=1915(c)#waivers (last visited Mar. 2, 2013): 
In accordance with OAC 317:40-1-1, initiation of services occurs in chronological order 
from the waiting list based on the date of receipt of a written request for services. The in-
dividual must meet the financial and medical eligibility criteria and have critical support 
needs that can be met by the IHSW-A. Exceptions to the chronological requirement may 
be made when an emergency exists.  
Thus, “[w]orking applications dated April 19, 2005 as of 8/19/13” equates to a wait time of eight years and four 
months. 
 188.  Schwalb, supra note 12, at 809; see Harrington et al., supra note 170, at 12-13. 
 189.  SMITH, supra note 181, at 11. 
 190.  President George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 
26, 1990), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/features/2010-ada/StatementbythePresident_2.pdf. 
 191.  COLKER, supra note 21, at 23. 
 192.  Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: The Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 at 1 (July 26, 1990); see COLKER, supra note 21, at 26. 
 193.  COLKER, supra note 21, at 27. 
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islation, but the overall legislative intent remained crystal clear throughout this time: the 
broad purpose of the ADA was to assist Americans with disabilities.194 The ADA ad-
dressed congressional findings that included the recognition that “society has tended to 
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities” and that “such forms of discrimina-
tion . . . continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”195 Congress specifically 
included “institutionalization” among the critical areas where discrimination against 
people with disabilities exists.196 
To remedy discrimination and promote integration, the ADA encompasses a wide 
range of subjects, from private employment in Title I to telecommunications in Title 
IV.197 Title II covers state and local government programs and services, including state 
Medicaid programs.198 Relevant to the choice of HCBS rather than institutional services, 
the statute requires that “[a] public entity shall administer services, programs, and activi-
ties in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with 
disabilities.”199 One provision of the ADA that states frequently use as a defense in wait-
ing list lawsuits is the “fundamental alteration” provision that exempts the failure to 
“make reasonable modifications . . . [to accommodate] individuals with disabilities” 
when such modifications “would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”200 
III. ANALYSIS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION IS DISCRIMINATION (SOMETIMES) 
A. Olmstead v. L.C.: The Landmark Case Impacting HCBS 
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided the groundbreaking case of Olmstead v. L.C., 
often referred to as the Brown v. Board of Education for disability rights.201 Both 
Olmstead and Brown involved individuals subjected to pervasive discrimination and seg-
regation, and both created huge challenges to the Court in designing effective practical 
remedies.202 Like integration of African American children into public schools, integra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 194.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 327:  
PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this Act—(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a 
central role in enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals 
with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the 
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to ad-
dress the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.  
See COLKER, supra note 21, at 23. 
 195.  Americans with Disabilities Act at § 2(a)(2).  
 196.  Id. at § 2(a)(3). 
 197.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et. seq. (2012). 
 198.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2012). 
 199.  28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (d) (2011). 
 200.  28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(7) (2011). 
 201.  Charles R. Bliss & C. Talley Wells, Applying Lessons from the Evolution of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion to Olmstead: Moving from Gradualism to Immediate, Effective, and Comprehensive Integration, 26 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 705, 705 (2010). 
 202.  Id. at 705-06. 
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tion of people with I/DD into communities necessitated massive changes to state and 
federal government entities, substantial monetary investment, and new thought patterns 
for public officials and private citizens.203 In Olmstead, as in Brown, the Court’s holding 
left important questions unanswered, thus limiting relief for victims of discrimination.204 
The Olmstead Court considered the proper construction of ADA Title II’s antidis-
crimination provision and attempted to answer the question, “[d]oes Title II of the ADA 
require placing people with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in insti-
tutions?”205 As the petitioners explained, “[t]his case represents an attempt by a federal 
agency with no historic expertise in the area of mental health care to resolve a complex 
social and medical debate through the general terms of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (the ADA).”206 The Court answered the thorny question with a qualified yes, holding 
that: 
 
under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide community-
based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s 
treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, 
the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement 
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.207 
 
The Olmstead legacy began when the Atlanta Legal Aid Society brought an action 
against the state of Georgia challenging the continued confinement of two women in an 
institutional setting despite community-based programs that could meet their needs.208 
The two women, Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson, each had a mental illness in addition to 
I/DD.209 In May of 1992, Lois voluntarily entered Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta 
(“GRH”) for treatment in a psychiatric unit.210 A year later, Lois’s treatment team agreed 
that a state-supported community-based program could appropriately serve her needs.211 
However, Lois remained institutionalized until the State placed her in community-based 
treatment in February 1996.212 Similarly, Elaine was voluntarily admitted to GRH for 
psychiatric treatment and continued to be confined there despite her psychiatrist’s evalu-
ation that she could be appropriately treated in the community.213 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See Cerreto, supra note 30, at 69-70. 
 205.  See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
 206.  Brief for Petitioners at *2, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98–536), 1999 
WL 54623. 
 207.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999). 
 208.  Cerreto, supra note 30, at 49-50. 
 209.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 at 593 (noting that Lois Curtis was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia while Elaine Wilson was diagnosed with a personality disorder). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
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The Atlanta Legal Aid Society brought action in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia and argued that the ongoing institutionalization of 
Lois and Elaine violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA.214 They requested an 
injunction providing public financed community placements and services, but did not 
seek any damages.215 Refraining from ruling on the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, the 
district court based its ruling on the ADA claim and ordered the State to immediately 
place Lois and Elaine in residential community settings and provide all appropriate ser-
vices.216 The district court held that “under the ADA, unnecessary institutional segrega-
tion of the disabled constitutes discrimination per se, which cannot be justified by a lack 
of funding.”217 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment 
that the State discriminated against the women by confining them in a segregated institu-
tion rather than in community-based programs.218 The court of appeals emphasized that 
legislative history and the clear language of ADA Title II regulations showed that “Con-
gress wanted to permit a cost defense only in the most limited of circumstances.”219 The 
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court “for further findings related to the 
State’s defense that the relief sought by plaintiffs would ‘fundamentally alter the nature 
of the service, program, or activity.’”220 
The state of Georgia appealed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to the Supreme 
Court, which granted certiorari and heard the case on April 21, 1999.221 By this time, the 
State had acquiesced, and Lois and Elaine were receiving services in community set-
tings.222 However, the case continued because the controversy was “capable of repetition, 
yet evading review,” as indicated by Lois and Elaine’s multiple institutional place-
ments.”223 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in substantial part, 
holding that undue institutionalization “is properly regarded as discrimination based on 
disability.”224 However, the Court found the court of appeals’ remand instruction to be 
improperly restrictive, so the Court remanded the case for further consideration of the 
appropriate relief in view of the State’s available resources, range of services for people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 214.  Brief for Petitioners at *11, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98–536), 1999 
WL 54623. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. at *12. 
 217.  L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead at *3, 1997 WL 148674 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1997), aff’d and remanded 
sub nom. L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, re-
manded sub nom. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 218.  L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded sub nom. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 219.  Id. at 902. 
 220.  Id. at 895 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). 
 221.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 594-96 (1999); Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Olmstead v. 
LC and EW Landmark Case, ATLANTALEGALAID.ORG, http://www.atlantalegalaid.org/impact.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Atlanta]. 
 222.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 594 n.6 (1999) (internal citations omitted); Atlanta, 
supra note 221. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 597. 
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with mental disabilities, and obligation to administer these services equitably.225 Con-
sistent with the district court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court limited its as-
sessment to the statutory issue of the meaning of ADA Title II and declined to address 
the Fourteenth Amendment claims.226 
The Supreme Court provided several bases for its holding that unjustified institu-
tional isolation of people with disabilities fits within ADA Title II’s definition of “dis-
crimination.”227 First, the Court noted that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the agency 
responsible for issuing regulations to implement Title II, has consistently advanced that 
view.228 Also, the Supreme Court emphasized that Congress expressly stated in the ADA 
that unjustified “segregation” of people with disabilities is a “form of discrimination.”229 
In addition, the Court explained that unjustified institutional segregation of people with 
disabilities “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable 
or unworthy of participating in community life.”230 Finally, the Supreme Court described 
the impact of institutionalization as “severely diminish[ing] the everyday life activi-
ties . . . including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independ-
ence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.”231 
Because ADA Title II recognizes unjustified institutionalization of people with 
disabilities as discrimination, Title II regulations include an “integration mandate” that 
states, “[a] public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”232 
However, the “reasonable modifications regulation” of Title II allows states to continue 
to segregate people with disabilities, as the Supreme Court noted:233 
 
A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, prac-
tices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid dis-
crimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter 
the nature of the service, program, or activity.234 
 
The Supreme Court criticized the court of appeals construction of the reasonable 
modifications regulation as unacceptable because “it would leave the State virtually de-
fenseless once it is shown that the plaintiff is qualified for the service or program she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. at 588. 
 227.  See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597-602 (1999). 
 228.  Id. at 597. 
 229.  Id. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(2), (a)(5)). 
 230.  Id. at 600. 
 231.  Id. at 601. 
 232.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)(1998)). 
 233.  See id. at 592. 
 234.  Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998) and explaining that “[w]e recite these regulations with the 
caveat that we do not here determine their validity.”). 
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seeks.”235 The Court held that the fundamental alteration doctrine allows a state to show 
that allocating its available resources to provide immediate relief for plaintiffs would be 
inequitable because of the state’s responsibility to provide care and treatment for a large 
diverse class of people with mental disabilities.236 The Court stated that for some indi-
viduals “no placement outside the institution may ever be appropriate” and expressed 
concern that phasing out state institutions would place some patients at risk.237 
Emphasizing that the ADA does not require states to phase out their institutions, 
the Court provided an example of how a state could meet the reasonable modifications 
standard.238 By showing that “it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for plac-
ing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list 
that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its insti-
tutions fully populated,” a state would satisfy the reasonable modifications standard.239 
Since Olmstead, more than half the states have used this example to develop “Olmstead 
plans.”240 After developing Olmstead plans, a number of states have used their plans as a 
defense in lawsuits brought by people on waiting lists for HCBS.241 
The Olmstead decision elated many disability advocates as they anticipated a rapid 
expansion of Medicaid HCBS,242 while others expressed skepticism and lamented the 
shortcomings of the Court’s holdings.243 Dr. Paul Applebaum opined that “the decision 
in Olmstead v. L.C. is unlikely to precipitate the widespread creation of community-
based services for persons with mental disabilities.”244 Although the Court decided that 
requiring individuals to receive services in segregated institutions qualifies as illegal dis-
crimination under the ADA, it did not order an end to institutional isolation or require a 
change in Medicaid’s institutional bias.245 The institutional bias remains because Medi-
caid regulations forbid states from limiting access to or having waiting lists for institu-
tional services, but allow states to limit access to and have waiting lists for home and 
community-based services.246 Further, although states’ implementation of robust 
Olmstead plans expand access to HCBS, numerous disability advocates and commenta-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 235.  Id. at 603. 
 236.  Id. at 604. 
 237.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1999). 
 238.  Id. at 605-06. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  See Terence Ng, Alice Wong & Charlene Harrington, Olmstead Plans and Related State Activity, UCSF 
Nat’l Ctr. for Pers. Assistance Servs., http://www.pascenter.org/olmstead/olmsteadplans.php (last updated Dec. 
2012). 
 241.  See e.g., Benjamin v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Penn., 768 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“De-
fendants assert that there is no violation of Title II and Section 504 because DPW now has an Olmstead plan.”).  
 242.  Olmstead v. L.C.: The Interaction of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Medicaid, Kaiser 
Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,  3 (2004), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7096a.cfm [hereinafter KFF OLMSTEAD]. 
 243.  See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find Out When You 
Reach The Top, You’re On The Bottom”: Are the Americans With Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Any-
thing More Than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 235, 257-58 (2002). 
 244.  Id. at 258, (quoting Paul S. Appelbaum, Least Restrictive Alternative Revisited: Olmstead’s Uncertain 
Mandate for Community-Based Care, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1271, 1272 (1999)). 
 245.  KFF OLMSTEAD, supra note 242, at 3.  
 246.  ICF/IID MEDICAID, supra note 90. 
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tors cite courts’ deference to state plans, and even the plans themselves, as “roadblocks 
to integration.”247 
Olmstead parallels Brown with regard to the slow pace of reversing discrimina-
tion.248 Ten years after Brown, despite the Court’s “all deliberate speed” requirement, 
many southern school districts remained segregated.249 Similarly, more than ten years 
after Olmstead, and despite the Court’s requirement that waiting lists move at a “reason-
able pace,” thousands of people with I/DD wait years for HCBS so that they can be inte-
grated into life in their communities.250 
B. Implementing Olmstead 
Because the issue in Olmstead involved two women who remained institutional-
ized without justification, the Court did not address the applicability of ADA’s integra-
tion mandate to individuals living outside of institutions.251 Subsequent courts in various 
jurisdictions have extended the scope of the integration mandate to include people living 
at home or in the community who are in imminent need of services in order to avoid in-
stitutionalization.252 In Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, the Tenth Circuit ex-
plained the rationale, stating, “[the integration mandate] would be meaningless if plain-
tiffs were required to segregate themselves by entering an institution before they could 
challenge an allegedly discriminatory law or policy that threatens to force them into seg-
regated isolation.”253 
Although the Olmstead Court held that the fundamental alteration doctrine limits 
the state’s responsibility to provide community services to qualified individuals with dis-
abilities,254 this defense requires more than a mere budget constraint.255 In Benjamin H. 
v. Ohl, which involved individuals with I/DD on waiting lists for HCBS, the district 
court explained that if courts permitted budget constraints alone to constitute a defense, 
“[s]tates could easily renege on their part of the Medicaid bargain by simply failing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 247.  Eric Carlson & Gene Coffey, 10-Plus Years after the Olmstead Ruling: Progress, Problems, and Op-
portunities, NAT’L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR. 26 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.nsclc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/NSCLC-Olmstead-Report.pdf. 
 248.  Bliss, supra note 201, at 718-19. 
 249.  Id. at 712. 
 250.  Bliss, supra note 201, at 718-19; Terence Ng, HCBS Waiver Wait Lists: National Estimates 2012, at 3 
(2013), available at 	   http://nasuad.org/documentation/HCBS_2013/Presentations/9.11%2010.00-
11.15%20Roosevelt.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 251.  See generally Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 252.  David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 763, 795-96 
(2010); see Statement of the Department of Justice on Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C., Civil Rights Div., U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.htm; Training and Advocacy Support Center, Docket 
of Cases Related to Enforcement of the ADA Title II “Integration Regulation” 5 (2012), available at 	  
http://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Issues/Community_integration/Resources/Docket_of_Olmstead_Litig
ation_updated_September_2012.pdf. 
 253.  Id. at 796 (citing Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
 254.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999). 
 255.  Kubo, supra note 12, at 756-57. 
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appropriate sufficient funds.”256 
The Civil Rights Division of the DOJ provides guidance on compliance with the 
integration mandate of the ADA.257 Consistent with the Benjamin H. holding, the DOJ 
instructs that “budget cuts can violate the ADA and Olmstead when significant funding 
cuts to community services create a risk of institutionalization or segregation.”258 Further, 
the DOJ explains that “[a] state’s obligations under the ADA are independent from the 
requirements of the Medicaid program . . . . For example, the fact that a state is permitted 
to ‘cap’ the number of individuals it serves in a particular waiver program under the 
Medicaid Act does not exempt the state from serving additional people in the community 
to comply with the ADA or other laws.”259 
In 2009, the DOJ initiated efforts to enforce the Olmstead decision.260 The DOJ 
works with state and federal officials to ensure that people with disabilities receive ser-
vices in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.261 In addition, the DOJ in-
vestigates complaints of violations of Olmstead, including complaints from people with 
I/DD on waiting lists for HCBS.262 Recent DOJ investigations in Georgia and Virginia 
have resulted in settlement agreements in which the States have agreed to substantial in-
creases in the number of HCBS waivers available to people with I/DD.263 To date, the 
DOJ has been involved in federal courts in efforts to enforce Olmstead in nineteen 
states.264 
C. Policy Considerations Compel an End to Waiting Lists 
In law as in science, a paradigm shift occurs when pressure builds up to the point 
of no return.265 Then an abrupt change occurs.266 When society evolves and established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 256.   Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing Long Waits for Home and Community-Based Care 
through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 142-43 (2001) (quoting Benjamin H. v. Ohl, Civ. 
No. 3:99-0338, slip op. at 25-26 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999)). 
 257.  Statement of the Department of Justice on Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C., Civil Rights Div., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.htm. 
 258.  Id.  
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Olmstead: Community Integration for Everyone, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/ (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  See Olmstead Cases by Circuit Court of Appeals, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www. 
ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_enforcement.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 263.  U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States v. Georgia, Civil No. 1:10-CV-249-CAP, Settlement Agreement 
fact sheet 1 (2010), available at http://www.ada.gov/ olmstead/documents/georgia_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2013) (“Georgia will create 1150 home and community based waivers for individuals with develop-
mental disabilities by July 1, 2015”); U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Virginia ADA Settlement Fact Sheet 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/virginia_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (“A 
total of approximately 4,200 home and community based waivers to help individuals with intellectual and de-
velopmental disabilities leave institutional settings, including Training Centers, and to prevent the unnecessary 
institutionalization of individuals who are currently on long waitlists for services in the community.”).  
 264.  See Ng et al., supra note 240. The DOJ participated in Olmstead and Olmstead-related lawsuits in Ala-
bama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 
 265.  Rex. J. Zedalis, Professor of Law at The University of Tulsa College of Law, Lecture to Property Law 
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precedents produce results in direct conflict with society’s goals, the rules must 
change.267 Brown v. Board of Education268 illustrates this, as the Supreme Court finally 
rejected its dysfunctional “separate but equal” doctrine.269 With Olmstead, as with 
Brown, the Supreme Court’s decision signaled a paradigm shift, but many states reacted 
slowly and discrimination continued.270 Criticizing state and local governments’ re-
sistance to compliance with Brown, Justice Black emphasized that “[t]here has been en-
tirely too much deliberation and not enough speed. . . .”271 Similarly, a number of states 
continue to violate the Olmstead requirement272 that a waiting list for HCBS must 
“[move] at a reasonable pace.”273 As Congress noted in the PPACA: 
 
Despite the . . . Olmstead decision, the long-term care provided to our 
Nation’s elderly and disabled has not improved. In fact, for many, it has 
gotten far worse. . . . Although every State has chosen to provide cer-
tain services under home and community-based waivers, these services 
are unevenly available within and across States, and reach a small per-
centage of eligible individuals.274 
 
What would happen if people had to add their names to a list and wait, sometimes 
years, before there was an opening allowing them to vote, or go to public schools, or use 
public transportation?275 Congress passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehen-
sive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disa-
bilities.”276 The legislators specifically noted that people with disabilities faced discrimi-
nation that includes “institutionalization”277 and the Supreme Court concurred in that 
respect.278 Inexplicably contradicting themselves, the legislature and courts perpetuate a 
federal and state Medicaid system that discriminates against thousands of individuals 
with I/DD by offering them a “choice” between unnecessary segregation in an institution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Class at The University of Tulsa College of Law (Jan. 29, 2013) (lecture notes on file with author) (citing 
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (3d ed. 1996)). 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 269.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896). 
 270.  Bliss, supra note 201, at 718-19. 
 271.  Id. at 713 (citing Griffin v. Cnty Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964)). 
 272.  See Bliss, supra note 200, at 718; Kaiser Family Found., Waiting Lists for Medicaid 1915(c) Home and 
Community-Based (HCBS) Waivers, 2010, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=246&cat=4&sub=62&yr=138&typ=1 (last visited Mar. 
17, 2014) (showing the number of Americans with ID/DD on waiting lists in each state for Medicaid 1915(c) 
HCBS in 2010). 
 273.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 (1999). 
 274.  Carlson & Coffey, supra note 247, at 3 (quoting the PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2406). 
 275.  Gaughan, supra note 12, at 418. 
 276.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 277.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2012). 
 278.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999) (“Recognition that unjustified institutional 
isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination reflects two evident judgments . . . .”). 
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or a lengthy wait for services.279 
1. States Have Had Ample Time to Experiment with HCBS Waiver Programs 
States have been participating in Medicaid’s HCBS waiver program since Con-
gress enacted it in 1981.280 By authorizing CMS to waive several Medicaid provisions 
when approving state HCBS programs, the legislature hoped to encourage states to ex-
periment and thus develop innovative ways of providing community services.281 The 
statutory language for demonstration projects fails to adequately address the scope of 
HCBS required today.282 After three decades of experience with waivers, at least two 
commentators believe that “[i]f Medicaid waivers have taught us anything, it is that state 
experimentation in this program teaches us very little.”283 There are vast disparities in 
access to HCBS programs, as people with I/DD receive services without delay in some 
states while residents of other states wait years to receive HCBS.284 The time has come 
for improved federal oversight so that the best practices are adopted nationwide.285 
Enacting HCBS as an optional and experimental program made sense as a starting 
point for deinstitutionalization at a time when large state institutions provided long-term 
care for people with I/DD.286 When Congress created the HCBS waiver authority, nu-
merous policy experts expected HCBS to later become a part of regular Medicaid state 
plan coverage.287 Although Congress granted states authority to include HCBS under 
Medicaid state plans in 2007, the statute allowed states to disregard several Medicaid re-
quirements.288 The PPACA went even further, eliminating a state’s authority to cap en-
rollment if the state chooses to offer coverage of HCBS in its state plan under Section 
1915(i) authority.289 But, because states have the option to choose whether to include 
HCBS in their state Medicaid plans, the majority of states continue to use Section 
1915(c) waiver authority for HCBS for people with I/DD so that the states can limit en-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 279.  See Gaughan, supra note 12, at 437. 
 280.  See GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 94; discussion supra Part II. 
 281.  See GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 90-91; discussion supra Part II. 
 282.  See Williams, supra note 92, at 236. 
 283.  Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The 
Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266, 283 (2011) (citing Frank J. Thompson & 
Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and 
Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 971 (2007)). 
 284.  Ng & Harrington, supra note 183, at 6-7 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/LTC-
Slides-02-07-2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013); see Harrington et al., supra note 170, at 3-6. 
 285.  See Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv. 
 286.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 6-8, 42 (citing statistics on deinstitutionalization and noting the shift 
from institutional care to community services: “[T]he official position of the professional leadership of most 
states’ developmental disability and mental health agencies is that the overwhelming majority of people with 
those disabilities do not need to live in institutions. . . . deinstitutionalization advocates shifted their goals from 
rights to services . . . .”). 
 287.  GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 114. 
 288.  Id. at 116 (explaining that section 1915(i) allows states to disregard the statewideness and in-
come/resources provisions of the act, and section 1915(j) allows states to disregard the comparability, 
statewideness, and income/resources provisions of the act). 
 289.  Id. at 117-18.  
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rollment.290 
2. States Offer Unconvincing Arguments against HCBS Expansion 
Despite recent federal encouragement for states to expand HCBS,291 state programs 
have not kept up with demand.292 Blaming the recession, states limit HCBS coverage and 
access, leaving many people with I/DD underserved or without any services.293 In reality, 
limiting access to HCBS represents a political choice, not an economic imperative.294 
HCBS waiver programs are a prime target for state budget cuts for two reasons.295 First, 
unlike institutional care, federal Medicaid law does not mandate HCBS coverage.296 Se-
cond, citizens with I/DD have historically lacked political power,297 and many have been 
deprived of their right to vote.298 About thirty states ban voting by individuals after court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 290.  See  Smith et al., supra note 84, at 48 (stating that nine states had the HCBS state plan option in place 
during FY 2012, and four more plan to implement it by FY 2014). 
 291.  Id. (discussing PPACA options that provide incentives for states to expand HCBS). 
 292.  KAISER, supra note 180, at 3.  
 293.  Cabansag, supra note 51, at 1046. 
 294.  For example, Oklahomans with I/DD wait over eight years for HCBS, yet state leaders want to cut the 
state income tax rate, which would decrease revenue available to fund state services such as HCBS. OKDHS, 
supra note 13 (“Working applications dated April 19, 2005 as of 8/19/13.”). When waivers become available, 
applications are processed on a first-come, first-served basis. See Oklahoma In-Home Supports waiver for 
adults, available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html?filterBy=1915(c)#waivers (last visited Mar. 2, 2013): 
In accordance with OAC 317:40-1-1, initiation of services occurs in chronological order 
from the waiting list based on the date of receipt of a written request for services. The in-
dividual must meet the financial and medical eligibility criteria and have critical support 
needs that can be met by the IHSW-A. Exceptions to the chronological requirement may 
be made when an emergency exists.  
Thus, “[w]orking applications dated April 19, 2005 as of 8/19/13” equates to a wait time of eight years and four 
months; Governor Mary Fallin’s 2014 State of the State Address at 11 (Feb. 3, 2014) (“this legislative session I 
have included in my budget an additional quarter-point income tax reduction that will return over $100 million 
to the state economy once fully realized.”); Randy Ellis, Oklahoma House Approves Tax Cut Bill, 
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 6, 2014: 
Following passionate debate, the Oklahoma House of Representatives approved a bill 
Thursday to cut the state’s top individual income tax rate by 0.25 percent and the corpo-
rate income tax rate by 1 percent. . . . The state Senate previously passed its own income 
tax cut bill, so negotiators from the two chambers will now meet to see if they can agree 
on a version that can pass both houses and be presented to the governor for final approv-
al.  
See Budget and Taxes, Okla. Policy Inst., OKPOLICY.ORG, http://okpolicy.org/issues/responsible-budget-taxes 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014); Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1555, 1598 (2007): 
So there is institutionalization by the budget. The legislation to require Medicaid to pay 
for home and community-care has been introduced for a decade and never moved past 
hearings and scoring. Legislators can feel confident that they can camouflage their deci-
sion to oppose or simply fail to support such legislation as simply “the budget,” without 
confronting the values implicit in that calculation. 
 295.  See Still Waiting . . . The Unfulfilled Promise of Olmstead, Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, 8 
(2009), available at https://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=S5nUuNhJSoM%3d&tabid=104 (cit-
ing Nat’l Council on Disability, National Disability Policy: A Progress Report 30 (2009)). 
 296.  Harrington et al., supra note 170, at 2. 
 297.  Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197-98 (1984). 
 298.  ALLISON C. CAREY, ON THE MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 2, 9-10 (2010); Jennifer A. Bindel, Equal Protection Jurisprudence and the 
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proceedings in which the individuals have been determined to be “mentally incompetent” 
or “mentally incapacitated.”299 While these court determinations assess an individual’s 
ability to meet basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter, the assessment rarely involves 
voter competence.300 In addition to legally sanctioned obstacles to voting, election offi-
cials, poll workers, and residential care workers sometimes improperly prevent people 
with intellectual disabilities from exercising their lawful rights to vote.301 
Even in good economic times, legislation to provide HCBS for all eligible individ-
uals has met resistance because of conjecture that providing services in community set-
tings brings people who need services “out of the woodwork.”302 To be eligible for 
HCBS, an individual must meet the criteria for an institutional level of care.303 Informal 
caregivers, such as family and friends, allow many HCBS-qualified people to avoid insti-
tutionalization; decision makers fear that these people would use HCBS if it was availa-
ble, adding to the cost of the programs.304 There is dispute over the accuracy of the 
woodwork effect, and a study of state spending on long-term care services from 1995 to 
2005 showed that expanding HCBS resulted in cost savings in the long run, despite an 
initial short-term spending increase.305 Further, policymakers explain that state expansion 
of HCBS represents a stimulus to a state’s economy.306 The federal government contrib-
utes at least one dollar for every dollar the state spends on HCBS, and those monies buy 
services that create jobs and stimulate the state’s economy.307 Also, a state’s economy 
benefits when expanded access to HCBS relieves the demands on family members and 
friends who serve as informal caregivers for people with I/DD.308 Without HCBS, many 
of these informal caregivers cut back on household spending, postpone personal medical 
care, and limit their work hours, leading to losses in business productivity and economic 
activity that ultimately hurt state revenue.309 Congress also recognized the economic as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Voting Rights of Persons with Diminished Mental Capacities, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87, 87 (2009); 
Cabansag, supra note 51, at 1046; Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capaci-
ty, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 105-06. 
 299.  Kimberly Leonard, Keeping the “Mentally Incompetent” from Voting, ATLANTIC, Oct. 17, 2012, avail-
able at http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/10/keeping-the-mentally-incompetent-from-
voting/263748/ (citing Election Protection, State Laws Affecting the Voting Rights of People with Mental Disa-
bilities, 866OURVOTE.ORG, http://www.866ourvote.org/newsroom/publications/body/0049.pdf). 
 300.  Id. at 5. 
 301.  Id. at 6-7. 
 302.  Mark C. Weber, Home and Community Based Services, Olmstead and Positive Rights: A Preliminary 
Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 288 (2004); See Gaughan, supra note 12, at 415; Perkins& Boyle, 
supra note 256, at 119.  
 303.  42 C.F.R. § 441.302 (2012). 
 304.  Harrington et al., supra note 170, at 19. 
 305.  Id. at 19-20 (2009) (citing H. Stephen Kaye, Mitchell P. LaPlante, & Charlene Harrington, Do Noninsti-
tutional Long-Term Care Services Reduce Medicaid Spending?, 28(1) HEALTH AFFS. 262 (2009)).  
 306.  2010 Policy Directors Annual Meeting CSI Briefing Book, Ctr. for State Innovation 64 (2010),  availa-
ble at http://www.stateinnovation.org/Events/Event-Listing/PDAM-09/Briefing-Book/Complete-Briefing-
Book-with-Cover--PDAM-2010-FOR-W.aspx [hereinafter Innovation]; Jim Nicholson, Director of Develop-
mental Disabilities Services Division of Oklahoma Department of Human Services (“OKDHS/DDSD”), Re-
marks at the OKDHS/DDSD Waiting List Meeting (Dec. 18, 2012) (meeting notes on file with author). 
 307.  Innovation, supra note 306, at 64; Nicholson, supra note 306. 
 308.  Innovation, supra note 306, at 65; Nicholson, supra note 306. 
 309.  Innovation, supra note 306, at 65.  
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well as moral benefits of fully integrating people with I/DD into society, finding when it 
enacted the ADA that: 
 
the [continuing] existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on 
an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free so-
ciety is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dol-
lars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonpro-
ductivity.310 
 
3. Individuals and Society Benefit when People with I/DD are Fully Integrated 
Ending discrimination against people with disabilities should prevail regardless of 
whether HCBS helps or hurts state economies.311 Justin Dart, Jr., recognized as the “fa-
ther of the ADA,”312 testified before a Senate Committee with these convicting words: 
 
Is ADA affordable? Equality affordable in America? Would this ques-
tion be asked about black, Hispanic or Jewish people? The very ques-
tion reveals an unconscious assumption of inequality. The very ques-
tion demonstrates most dramatically the absolute necessity for a 
national mandate of equality. Not since the abolition of slavery has the 
principle of equality been negotiable for money in the United States of 
America.313 
 
Hostility, prejudice, and fear flourish when people with I/DD remain segregated 
and out of sight.314 Government endorsement of the segregation reinforces the stereotype 
of inferiority and the acceptability of discrimination.315 While reshaping attitudes takes 
time, interactions between people with and without disabilities break down barriers and 
reduce prejudice.316 
Although some controversy remains regarding the wisdom of abolishing institu-
tions and providing community services regardless of impairments,317 studies show that 
even individuals with severe disabilities can thrive in community settings.318 Institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 310.  Cook, supra note 51, at 457-58 (1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8)). 
 311.  See DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1388. 
 312.  In Memoriam: Justin Dart, Jr., Office of Special Educ. & Rehabilitative Servs., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., , 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/dart.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
 313.  Cook, supra note 51, at 459 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 
(1989) (statement of Mr. Dart)). 
 314.  Weber, supra note 302, at 274-75.  
 315.  Id. at 274. 
 316.  See Cook, supra note 51, at 397-98; Weber, supra note 302, at 274-75. 
 317.  Colker, supra note 28, at 1420, 1423. 
 318.  Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 12-13.  
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resources can be replicated in the community, allowing medically fragile individuals and 
individuals with severe behavioral and cognitive challenges to successfully live in the 
community with the provision of necessary supports.319 Oklahoma transitioned over four 
hundred children and adults with I/DD into community homes when the Hissom Memo-
rial Center was closed in 1994 after parents filed a class action lawsuit demanding com-
munity service options.320 Studies tracking the transitioned residents show success in all 
cases, as moving into the community resulted in healthier, more active lives.321 In addi-
tion, a number of the former Hissom residents who had the most severe impairments 
showed the greatest progress.322 
Numerous studies provide evidence of benefits for people with I/DD who move 
from institutions into small community homes with appropriate supports.323 These bene-
fits include more interaction and better relationships with family, friends, and social 
groups;324 greater dignity and self-esteem;325 gains in adaptive behavior and daily living 
skills such as self-care and domestic skills;326 and better compliance with medication and 
treatment plans.327 Also, community living for people with I/DD results in increased in-
dependence and sense of competence, improved decision making, and better perceived 
quality of life.328 
Moreover, society as a whole benefits when people with I/DD participate in com-
munity life.329 Ongoing interactions among people with and without I/DD promote the 
development of relationships, break down stereotypes, and promote understanding and 
tolerance.330 Research shows that peers without I/DD have more positive attitudes about 
individuals with I/DD when those individuals interact with them in community set-
tings.331 Neighbors, teachers, employers, and even parents have better outlooks and high-
er expectations for individuals with I/DD who are fully included in integrated settings.332 
 4. Piecemeal Litigation Has Failed to Solve the Problem 
The federal government has made efforts to encourage states to implement 
Olmstead but has yet to establish a national plan for community integration of people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 319.  Cook, supra note 51, at 444. 	   320.	  	   OKDHS	  HSC,	  supra	  note	  66;	  see	  Homeward	  Bound,	  Inc.	  v.	  Hissom	  Mem'l	  Ctr.,	  85-­‐C-­‐437-­‐E,	  1987	  WL	  27104	  (N.D.	  Okla.	  July	  24,	  1987).	  
 321.  Letter from Cody Inman, Senior Public Affairs Officer, State of Oklahoma Office of the Governor, to 
Susan Witte, Oklahoma resident who has I/DD and has been on the waiting list for HCBS since 2007 (Jan. 9, 
2013) (on file with author); OKDHS HSC, supra note 66. 
 322.  Inman, supra note 321.  
 323.  E.g., Cmty. Living, supra note 61, at 3-8. 
 324.  DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1388; see Cook, supra note 51, at 450-51. 
 325.  DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1388; Karger, supra note 30, at 1227. 
 326.  Cmty. Living, supra note 61, at 8. 
 327.  DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1388. 
 328.  See Brief for United States as Amici Curiae, Olmstead v. L.C., E.W., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-
536), 1999 WL 143937, at *12-*15. 
 329.  See DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1404, 1409. 
 330.  See Cook, supra note 51, at 448-49. 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. 
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with I/DD.333 Further, most states have failed to commit to providing HCBS for all eligi-
ble individuals with I/DD.334 These shortcomings have produced an environment in 
which litigation has become the primary means of expanding access to HCBS.335 In addi-
tion to DOJ-initiated actions, individuals and advocacy groups have brought over fifty 
federal actions since Olmstead seeking HCBS for people living in the community who 
are at risk of institutionalization.336 Although settlements and court orders have granted 
some relief,337 waiting lists for HCBS remain a chronic problem that litigation alone is 
unlikely to solve.338 
Olmstead does not provide a bright line rule to decide if a state’s failure to provide 
HCBS violates the ADA integration mandate or is excused by the fundamental alteration 
doctrine.339 To be sure, jurisdictions vary in their interpretations of the Olmstead ruling 
and the integration mandate, and many courts often interpret them narrowly and with 
deference to state defendants.340 Because of federalism concerns and the complexity of 
Medicaid statutes, federal courts hesitate to rule against states that claim fundamental 
alteration as a defense to an Olmstead lawsuit.341 Even when courts rule against state de-
fendants or people with I/DD achieve apparent victory through a settlement agreement, 
success may be short lived if a state’s legislature refuses to allocate the funding needed 
to comply with the settlement agreement.342 People with I/DD face another obstacle 
when trying to gain HCBS through judicial avenues: the challenge of navigating the legal 
system.343 As one Senator explained during ADA hearings: 
 
[Y]ou do not find many individuals who have mental and physical dis-
abilities that have the time or the resources to go down to the court-
house to be able to get that injunction and bring the case. For the most 
part, they are spending their full time just coping with the difficulties 
and challenges of life. What we have seen in the areas of the disability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 333.  See DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1406-07. 
 334.  See DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1407 (“[F]ederal initiatives are vital and necessary steps; but, ultimately, 
a deep commitment by the state is required to make community living a reality for all citizens with disabili-
ties.”); see also Smith et al., supra note 84, at 46 (“[M]ost states already have limits in place for their commu-
nity-based services such as coverage limits, enrollment caps, and waiting lists for services . . . seven states in 
FY 2012 and four states in FY 2013 imposed additional restrictions directed at HCBS programs and services . . 
. .”).  
 335.  See DiPolito, supra note 45 at 1400, 1407. 
 336.  Training & Advocacy Support Ctr., supra note 252, at 48-71 (2012). 
 337.  See id. (describing litigation brought by people with I/DD at risk of institutionalization). 
 338.  See KFF Waiting, supra note 10 (stating 316,673 Americans with ID/DD were on waiting lists for Med-
icaid 1915(c) HCBS waivers in 2011). 
 339.  Ferleger, supra note 252, at 774-75.  
 340.  See Cabansag, supra note 51, at 1048, 1050-51. 
 341.  See Kubo, supra note 12, at 762-63. 
 342.  E.g., Margaret K. Feltz, Playing the Lottery: HCBS Lawsuits and Other Medicaid Litigation on Behalf 
of the Developmentally Disabled, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 236-38 (2002) (describing the Boulet case in which 
the Massachusetts legislature made drastic cuts following a settlement agreement, and disability advocates had 
to battle to reverse the budget cuts). 
 343.  See Cook, supra note 51, at 465 n.471 (Edward M. Kennedy, Senator, 135 Cong. Rec. S10,742 (daily 
ed. Sept. 7, 1989)). 
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movement is a different pattern in terms of litigation than has been in 
the case of some of the other violations of the basic civil rights.344 
 
Disappointed with the failure of litigation to produce widespread integration of 
people with disabilities, advocates contend that it is “past time for Olmstead implementa-
tion to move out of the courtroom and into America’s communities.”345 
D. Recommendations for Action 
Much like the judiciary’s limited impact346 on the HCBS waiting list problem, the 
federal executive branch’s efforts347 have also fallen short.348 Ultimately, the solution to 
the waiting list problem lies with the legislature—Congress must pass legislation that 
changes HCBS from waiver status to a state plan requirement.349 Elevating HCBS to the 
same status as other Medicaid programs will ensure that states no longer deny HCBS to 
qualified individuals with I/DD.350 As a result, more people with I/DD will be able to 
preserve their independence, maintain relationships with family and friends, and actively 
contribute to their communities, free from institutionalization.351 
A second step the federal government should take is assessing which HCBS pro-
grams are most effective and implementing these programs nationwide.352 CMS has a 
deep well of experience to draw best practices from, because states have been experi-
menting with HCBS waivers for over thirty years,353 and there are now over two hundred 
and fifty different waivers in place.354 Waiting times for HCBS vary widely from state to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 344.  Id. 
 345.  DiPolito, supra note 45, at 1400 (quoting Legal Advocate Cites Ongoing Segregation on Eve of 
Olmstead Anniversary, BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, 
http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bRBHCViwpf4%3D&tabid=328. (last updated June 2004)).  
 346.  See discussion supra Part III.C.4. 
 347.  See Exec. Order No. 13, 217, 66 F.R. 33155 (2001); Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 5 (describing Presi-
dent Obama’s Community Living Initiative and DOJ involvement in Olmstead enforcement); Harrington et al., 
supra note 170, at 6 (“In 2001, President Bush announced the New Freedom Initiative (NFI) (using an execu-
tive order), a cross-governmental policy and funding program that aimed to remove barriers to community liv-
ing for people with disabilities and provide additional momentum to efforts to comply with the Olmstead court 
ruling and the [ADA].”). 
 348.  The number of Americans with ID/DD on waiting lists for HCBS continues to grow, from 268,220 in 
2010, to 316,673 in 2011. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 272; KFF Waiting, supra note 10.  
 349.  See Gaughan, supra note 12, at 437; Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv, 6; The State of 21st Century 
Long-Term Services and Supports: Financing and Systems Reform for Americans with Disabilities, NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,  30 (2005), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2005/12152005. 
 350.  See Schwalb, supra note 12, at 849. 
 351.  See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 349, at 88 . 
 352.  Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv; see generally Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Quality of 
Care, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Quality-of-
Care/Quality-of-Care.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (“Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (CHIP) seek to provide safe, effective, efficient, patient-centered, high quality and equitable care to all 
enrollees. To achieve these goals, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) partners with states 
to share best practices and to provide technical assistance to improve the quality of care.”). 
 353.  See GETTINGS, supra note 11, at 90-91. 
 354.  See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 349, at 89. 
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state,355 including ten states reporting no waiting lists in 2011.356 Simply put, there are 
best practices in HCBS programming that need to be shared among the states.357 
While eliminating HCBS waiting lists will significantly expand opportunities for 
individuals with I/DD to be fully included in society, other challenges remain.358 HCBS 
represents one component of long-term services and supports (“LTSS”) for people with 
disabilities and the elderly.359 The growing demand and increasing costs of LTSS have 
produced a system that “is fast becoming financially unsustainable.”360 Therefore, sub-
stantial changes to federal policies and programs will be required361 to “assure equality of 
opportunity, full participation, [and] independent living” for people with I/DD.362 Ac-
cordingly, the National Council on Disability and the Human Services Research Institute 
have proposed policies and innovative solutions, including collaboration of private and 
government entities and resources, that will create a robust sustainable network of 
LTSS.363 
V. CONCLUSION 
People with I/DD “have been subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque 
mistreatment.”364 Disability advocates have convinced many states to close public insti-
tutions365 but have been less successful in establishing essential community supports.366 
Although “[f]ew assaults on individual dignity and self-determination are harsher than 
being forced to leave one’s home and community to live in a segregated environment,”367 
people with I/DD often face the dilemma of moving into an institution to receive services 
or going without.368 To alleviate this, CMS should determine the most effective HCBS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 355.  KAISER, supra note 180, at 3. 
 356.  Id. at 11. 
 357.  See Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv; see generally Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Quality 
of Care, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Quality-
of-Care/Quality-of-Care.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (“Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (CHIP) seek to provide safe, effective, efficient, patient-centered, high quality and equitable care to all 
enrollees. To achieve these goals, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) partners with states 
to share best practices and to provide technical assistance to improve the quality of care.”).  
 358.  See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, NATIONAL DISABILITY POLICY: A PROGRESS REPORT 7-
9 (2009) (the report “focus[es] on the current status of the quality of life of people with disabilities, and the 
emerging trends that warrant changes in the Federal Government’s disability policies and programs.”). 
 359.  See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 349, at 13, 17, 22. 
 360.  Id. at 21, 47. 
 361.  See NCD 2011, supra note 65 at 11, 79-80. 
 362.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012). 
 363.  See NCD 2011, supra note 65 at 79-80; see generally HUMAN RES. RESEARCH INST., WORKING 
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY SERVICE SYSTEMS (2012). 
 364.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 365.  NCD 2011, supra note 65 at 74, 88 (listing the states which have closed all ICF/IIDs: “District of Co-
lumbia (1991), New Hampshire (1991), Vermont (1993), Rhode Island (1994), Alaska (1997), New Mexico 
(1997), West Virginia (1998), Hawaii (1999), Maine (1999), Minnesota (2000), Indiana (2007), Michigan 
(2009), Oregon (2009), and Alabama (2012).”).   
 366.  See Bagenstos, supra note 44, at 21, 42. 
 367.  NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, NATIONAL DISABILITY POLICY: A PROGRESS REPORT 30 (2009). 
 368.  See Schwalb, supra note 12, at 832-33, 849; Flynn, supra note 12, at 417; Gaughan, supra note 12, at 
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waiver programs and work with states to implement these.369 Ultimately, the federal gov-
ernment must eliminate waiver waiting lists by making HCBS a Medicaid state plan re-
quirement370 so that people with I/DD will have “the opportunity to blend fully and 
equally into the rich mosaic of the American mainstream.”371 
 
In the 1960’s and earlier we were treated like plants. You fed us, 
clothed us, kept us warm, and wheeled us out to feel the sun. 
In the 1970s and 80s you discovered we could be taught—we could 
learn—and we were treated like pets. You taught us all types of tricks 
and we stood by your side. 
But now . . . Here we are. We are not plants. We are not your pets. 
We are people like you and we want to be treated as real people. We 
want the same opportunities as anybody.372 
 
Carol Beatty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437; Kubo, supra note 12, at 754. 
 369.  Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv; see generally Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Quality of 
Care, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Quality-of-
Care/Quality-of-Care.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (“Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (CHIP) seek to provide safe, effective, efficient, patient-centered, high quality and equitable care to all 
enrollees. To achieve these goals, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) partners with states 
to share best practices and to provide technical assistance to improve the quality of care.”).  
 370.  Harrington et al., supra note 170, at iv, 6; see NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 349, at 30 ; 
Gaughan, supra note 12, at 437. 
 371.  President George H.W. Bush, Remarks by the President during Ceremony for the Signing of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, at 2 (July 26, 1990), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/features/2010-
ada/RemarksbythePresident.pdf. 
 372.  Working Toward A Sustainable Future for Developmental Disability Service Systems, HUMAN RES. 
RESEARCH INST. 11 (2012), available at http://www.hsri.org/news-events/working-toward-a-sustainable-
future-for-developmental-disability-service-sy/. 
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